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Bewitched by the Word “Know”  
William H. Brenner, Norfolk / VA  
I 
You ask me if our friend is in town, I say yes; you ask, “Are 
you sure?,” I reply, “I know it – I just installed him in our 
guest room!”—What if you're mistaken?—One can't be 
making a mistake about something like that!---So you’re 
claiming infallibility?—Saying "I can't be making a mistake" 
was just a way of saying "I know ...”; I wasn’t alleging a 
ridiculous “justification” for my claim!---But only the infalli-
ble possession of truth really justifies a claim to knowl-
edge.—The “I know ...” is just an instrument with a limited, 
practical purpose -- a purpose which the following expan-
sion of the “builder's language" helps to bring out: 
The number [of building stones] is sometimes estimated, 
sometimes established by counting. Then the question 
arises “Do you believe there are as many stones as 
that?,” and the answer “I know there are – I’ve just 
counted them.” But then the “I know” could be dropped. 
If, however, there are several ways of finding something 
out for sure, like counting, weighing, measuring the 
stack, then the statement “I know” can take the place of 
mentioning how I know. [Wittgenstein 1969, sec. 564] 
---I'm inclined to doubt that what you are saying is particu-
larly relevant to the philosophical concept of knowledge.—
According to your philosophical concept, claiming to know 
(not merely believe) something entails a certain claim to 
infallibility – a claim that seems to me to conjure up the 
idea that whenever I make a knowledge-claim, I 
express a relation, not between me and the sense of a 
proposition (like ‘I believe’) but between me and a fact. 
So that the fact is taken into my consciousness. (Here is 
the reason why one wants to say that nothing that goes 
on in the outer world is really known, but only what hap-
pens in the domain of what are called sense data.) [ibid, 
sec. 90] 
This, however, is a false and mischievous picture: false 
because it misrepresents the use of the word "know" in our 
language and the role of the concept in our lives; mischie-
vous because "the problem of our knowledge of the 
external world" develops out of it. Behind that pseudo-
problem is 
a picture of knowing as the perception of an outer event 
through visual rays which project it as it is into the eye 
and the consciousness. [Given this picture,] the question 
at once arises whether one can be certain of this projec-
tion. [ibid.] 
Although the picture of knowing as "having the fact known 
within one's mind" is a wrong one, it does point to a use for 
sentences of the form "I know that such-and-such is so!,” 
namely, that in which they mean: "It’s so -- or else I’ve lost 
my mind!" This is the kind of – unusual but philosophically 
striking -- use we can imagine for the sentences Moore 
brought to our attention. 
"I know that I have two hands," said Moore in “Proof of 
an External World,” presenting this as a counterexample to 
the then-popular philosophical thesis that no empirical 
proposition is known to be true. Wittgenstein thought 
Moore's example important -- though not for the reason 
Moore presented: 
If I wanted to doubt whether this was my hand, how 
could I avoid doubting whether the word "hand" has any 
meaning? So that is something I seem to know after all. 
But more correctly: The fact that I use the word "hand" 
and all the other words in my sentences without a se-
cond thought ... shows that the absence of doubt be-
longs to the essence of the language game, that the 
question "How do I know ... “ drags out the language 
game, or else does away with it. [ibid, secs. 369-370] 
“My name is Bill; I’m now using my two hands ... “: only if I 
am mad can I take anything else to be possible; for if I’m 
wrong here, I must mistrust all my judgments. Although 
such propositions “have the character of experiential 
propositions, ... [their] truth is unassailable for me. That is 
to say, if I assume that they are false, I must mistrust all 
my judgments” (Wittgenstein 1992, p. 79).—“Propositions 
having the character of experiential propositions ... ”? ---I 
take it that Wittgenstein wants to contrast them with those 
paradigmatically non-empirical propositions of the philoso-
phical tradition sometimes called “analytic truths.” Now 
Wittgenstein clearly doesn’t go along with the common 
identification among philosophers of the “unassailable and 
certain” with that narrow range of propositions, nor with the 
common identification of the factual-empirical with the 
“falsifiable and merely probable.” In this, by the way, he is 
at one with Cardinal Newman, whom he mentions in the 
first section of On Certainty. “We are absolutely certain, 
beyond any possibility of doubt,“ remarked Newman in his 
Grammar of Assent, 
that Great Britain is an island.... There is no security on 
which we should be better content to stake our interests 
... We are as little exposed to the misgiving, “Perhaps 
we are not on an island after all,” as to the question, “Is it 
quite certain that the angle in a semi-circle is a right 
angle.” ... [Y]et are the arguments producible for it in 
black and white commensurate with this overpowering 
certitude about it? [Newman 1955, p. 234] 
While Wittgenstein would acknowledge that there are 
philosophers who say that it is just extremely probable that 
Great Britain is an island, he would also say that this 
makes little difference in their lives. Newman would have 
said that these philosophers give only “notional assent” to 
the view they assert, not “real assent.” Wittgenstein, 
however, would question whether they have really as-
serted anything at all, reasoning that when familiar words 
are abstracted from the familiar circumstances of their 
everyday employment, one can no longer be certain what, 
if anything, they’re supposed to mean.  
II 
Although words in a philosophical problem have the look 
and sound of words in an everyday question, they actually 
lack any clear sense -- or any clear sense the philosopher 
will want to avow. Recall the philosopher who explained 
the words “All empirical propositions are probable at best” 
by pointing out that every empirical proposition is logically 
contingent. Has he really done any more than stipulate a 
definition for “merely probable,” presenting a tautology to 
justify his stipulation? He will want to say Yes! And we will 
need to press him to explain what more. An important and 




distinctive leitmotiv in Wittgenstein’s thinking, early and 
late, is that no clear answer to such a “What more? ques-
tion” is going to satisfy the philosopher qua philosopher. 
In Wittgenstein’s view, philosophical problems take us to 
“the limits of language” and are therefore completely 
soluble: 
If I say: here we are at the limits of language, then it 
always sounds as if resignation were necessary, whe-
reas on the contrary complete satisfaction comes, since 
no question remains. The problems are dissolved in the 
actual sense of the word – like a lump of sugar in water. 
[Wittgenstein 1993, p. 183] 
The [true] aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point 
where language stops anyway. [ibid, p. 187] 
Oriented toward that aim, philosophy must struggle with 
“the oldest images that are engraved into our language 
itself” (ibid., pp. 183-184). For it is these images that 
generate and sustain the illusions of sense that lure 
thinkers over the edge of language. A notably seductive 
image, one Wittgenstein highlighted in Philosophical 
Investigations but struggles against in all his writings, is 
that of the meaning of a word as something we might 
“point to inwardly” and analyze without reference to what is 
going on “outwardly,” in the stream of human life and 
practice. For instance, in On Certainty we find him working 
against the notion that the objective certainty of Moore’s 
“Here is one hand” is something that might be understood 
in abstraction from what is going on outwardly, in one’s life: 
My life shows that I know or am certain that there is a 
chair over there, or a door, [or a hand] and so on—I tell 
a friend e.g. “Take that chair over there, “Shut the door,” 
[“Hand over the clicker”], etc. etc. [Wittgenstein 1969, 
sec. 7] 
When Moore insists he knows these things, however, “I 
know” gets misused: 
I know I’ve two hands.--- Nonsense! You’re holding them 
up and showing them to us.—So I don’t know it, then?!--
- Neither the question nor the assertion makes sense. 
Any more than the assertion “I am here,” which I might 
yet use at any moment, if suitable occasion presented 
itself.... It is only in use that the proposition has its 
sense. And “I know that I have two hands,” used in an 
unsuitable situation, seems not to be nonsense ... only 
because one can fairly easily imagine a situation to fit it 
... [ibid., sec. 10, modified] 
And through that misuse “a queer and extremely important 
mental state seems to be revealed” (sec. 6) – one differing 
from ordinary beliefs in that the fact believed is “taken into 
my consciousness” and therefore indubitable. Thus Moore, 
in his philosophical use of “I know,” thought he was 
describing a state of affairs guaranteeing what is known. 
His mistake “really come down to this: that the concept 
‘know’ is analogous to the concepts ‘believe’ ... in that the 
statement “I know ...” can’t be a mistake” (ibid., sec. 21).  
In his notorious argument against external-world skep-
tics (“Here is one hand, etc.”), Moore’s mistake was to 
assume that they asking a real question, an assumption 
stemming from the fact that the words, “Do physical 
objects really exist?” look and sound like a (much more 
general) instance of a familiar sort of question -- “Do extra-
terrestrial life forms really exist?,” for instance. This 
likeness led him to reply to the skeptic as if he were merely 
reminding him of something obviously true -- whereas, in 
fact: 
No such proposition as “There are physical objects” can 
be formulated because “physical object” is a logical 
concept (like color, quantity ... ) [ibid, sec. 90].  
A logical concept is an instrument of language having a 
purely grammatical function, that of helping to explain the 
meaning of a word by indicating “the post in the language 
where it is stationed” (PI, sec. 257). If, as in a well-known 
Blue Book example, I try to explain a new word, “TOVE” to 
you by pointing to something and saying, “This is called 
‘TOVE,’” you may have to ask me what kind of name 
“TOVE” is supposed to be, what “post” I’m meant to hitch it 
to. Is it a physical-object word, a color word, etc.etc.? 
In Philosophical Remarks, Wittgenstein explains that 
what he once called simples “were simply what I could 
refer to without running the risk of their possible non-
existence” (p. 72). Demystifying this in Philosophical 
Investigations, he compares “simples” with the samples 
used in ostensive definition. “What looks like it had to 
exist,” he explains, “is .... a paradigm in our language 
game; something with which comparison is made” (sec. 
50). What On Certainty adds to this can be summed up in 
the following dialogue, based (with stylistic and interpreta-
tive modifications) on secs. 477, 480, 4, 204, 18, and 402: 
Mustn’t one know that the objects whose names one is 
learning by ostensive definition exist?—Why should the 
language game rest on some kind of knowledge? Isn’t it 
enough that experience doesn’t later show the oppo-
site?—In teaching a child to use the common noun 
“door,” one might point to a door and say things like, “Big 
door!” Doesn’t he thereby come to know that a door 
exists?—His behavior shows that he is certain there’s a 
door over there: he knows what to do when we ask him 
to close it, for example. What I want to deny is that this 
sureness in the child’s behavior, this “knowing what do,” 
rests on knowledge. For I can see no sense in saying 
that someone’s sureness in action rests on something 
he knows (or believes) to be true unless I believe that 
he’s learned how to ask and answer questions of the 
form, “How do you know?” And I’m assuming that at a 
small child’s stage of development, this will not be so -- 
so that, for him, knowledge that doors, etc. exist is never 
something distinct from the sureness he shows in action. 
It’s not a kind of seeing on our part but our acting that 
lies at the bottom of the language game. 
“There are physical objects, colors, shapes, sensations, ...”: 
this sentence might function as a grammatical remark 
about the logical heterogeneity of words ordinary grammar 
lumps together as nouns. I think it important to see, 
however, that it does not function as do the “common-
sense truisms” Wittgenstein used to describe our Weltbild. 
Although not in everyday use, such truisms (e.g., that the 
earth is very old) all seem to have an imaginable empirical 
use. “There are physical objects, etc.,” in contrast, has only 
the potentially-misleading surface grammar of an empirical 
statement, never its actual or imaginable employment as 
an empirical proposition. 
The function in language of physical object is that of a 
variable. Just as “2" and “3" are values of the variable 
number, so “hand” and “book” are values of this variable. 
But in philosophy we tend to overlook the actual “variable” 
function of a words like physical object and to treat it as if it 
functioned as a value of some super-variable (“being”). As 
early as the Tractatus Wittgenstein was combating the 
illusion that it makes sense to say, “There are (or there 
aren’t) physical objects in the world” as one says (for 
instance), “There are (or are not) books in the locker.” 




“Do physical objects exist?” That’s one of the problems 
Wittgenstein saw as distinctively philosophical.  Such 
problems differ from others in that they “dissolve like lumps 
of sugar in water” once we carefully attend to actual use of 
the relevant words.— But it never seems to turn out that 
one’s attention has been careful enough to dissolve every 
lump!—Yes. Something always settles out that looks like a 
philosophical problem and calls for further investigation. 
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